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Gagnon. This is a fertile area for parolees anxious to test their status 
under the expanding requirements of due process and the newly develop- 
ing double jeopardy doctrine. Also, a precise definition of the standard 
of proof to be used in federal parole revocation hearings is needed. A 
radical modification of the standard of proof in revocation hearings will 
likely be difficult to achieve. Even though there are constitutional argu- 
ments favoring the change, the due process principles are sufficiently 
elusive to support either position.' 
In assessing the potential success of challenges to the law enunciated in 
Standlee, it is likely that an argument based upon the double jeopardy 
doctrine will be the stronger approach. First, there is already support for 
the position, as indicated by G r ~ y s o n . ~ ~  Second, the fifth amendment 
does not draw distinctions among the many types of proceedings, nor is 
the double jeopardy clause restricted to criminal trials. A single sover- 
eign should not be able to circumvent a constitutionally guaranteed free- 
dom by drawing meaningless distinctions between two closely related 
proceedings. Finally, the constitutional protection afforded by the 
double jeopardy doctrine in cases such as Standlee appeals to notions of 
fairness and justice, which may prove to be the single most important 
consideration when the question ultimately reaches the Supreme Court. 
Elections - CORRUPT PRACTICES -CORPORATE MONEY CONTRIBU- 
TIONS TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF BALLOT-MEASURE CAMPAIGNS -
Schwartz v .  Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). 
On May 24, 1971, the New York Legislature enacted the Transporta- 
tion Capital Facilities Bond Act of 1971 which authorized the State 
Comptroller to issue bonds in the amount of $2.5 billion upon approval 
by the voters in the 1971 general election.' A nonprofit corporation, 
Yes for Transportation in New York State, Inc. (YES), was organized on 
August 24, 197 1, to campaign for voter approval of the Act. YES received 
individual and corporate contributions, including $50,000 from the New 
York Telephone Company (NYT), a wholly owned subsidiary of Ameri- 
can Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). 
By letter dated January 26, 1972, the executive director of the Project 
on Corporate Responsibility (Project), a nonprofit corporation owning 
one share of AT&T stock, notified the Chairman of the Board of AT&T 
and the President of NYT of the Project's belief that NYT's $50,000 
contribution to YES violated section 460 of the New York Election Law 
74319 N.E.2d 43. 
'N.Y. CONST. art. VII, 5 1 1  disallows any legislative enactment which increases the public 
debt unless approved by a majority of the voters in a general election. The Capital Facilities 
Bond Act of 197 1 was not so approved in New York's 197 1 general election. 
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which prohibits corporate contributions to "any candidate for political 
office, or for nomination for such office, or for any political purpose what- 
ever . . . .'" Project demanded, on behalf of NYT's shareholders, that the 
officers and directors of NYT responsible for making the contribution 
be held personally liable for its repayment to NYT. NYT's General 
Solicitor responded that repayment would not be sought because NYT's 
officers and directors had made the contribution in the belief that it 
would advance the public welfare as well as NYT's interest in improved 
transportation, and in reliance upon the opinion of its own and outside 
counsel that the contribution did not violate section 460. 
T o  compel repayment of the $50,000, Project filed a shareholders 
derivative action, Schwartz v .  Romnes? against YES and the individual 
officers and directors of AT&T and NYT, respectively, alleging that 
NYT's contribution to YES violated section 460 of the New York Election 
Law and section 107 of the New York Public Service Law.4 On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the district court entered summary judg- 
2N.Y. ELECTION LAW 5 460 (McKinney Supp. 1973). In 1974, section 460 became section 
480(a) of the N.Y. ELECTION LAW. The New York Legislature also enacted section 480(b) which 
allows corporations to make political expenditures not exceeding $5000 in the aggregate in any 
one year notwithstanding the total prohibition of section 480(a). 
(a) No corporation orjoint-stock association doing business in this state, except a corpora- 
tion or association organized or maintained for political purposes only, shall directly or 
indirectly pay or use or offer, consent or agree to pay or use any money or property for or 
in aid of any political party, committee or organization, or for, [or] in aid of, any corpora- 
tion, joint-stock or other association organized or maintained for political purposes, or for, 
or in aid of, any candidate for political office or for nomination for such office, or for any 
political purpose whatever, or for the reimbursement or indemnification of any person for 
moneys or property so used. Any officer, director, stock-holder, attorney or agent of any 
corporation or joint-stock association which violates any of the provisions of this section, 
who participates in, aids, abets or advises or consents to any such violations, and any 
person who solicits or knowingly receives any money or property in violation of this 
section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision a of this section, any corporation or 
any organization financially supported, in whole or in part, by such corporation may 
make expenditures, including contributions, not otherwise prohibited by law, for 
political purposes, in any amount not to exceed five thousand dollars in the aggregate in 
any calendar year. 
N.Y. ELECTION LAW 5 480 (McKinney Supp. 1974). 
3357 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). Project commenced the 
original derivative action but was replaced by the present named plaintiff when it was deter- 
mined that Project was not a shareholder of AT&T at the time of the act complained of, as 
required for a derivative action by Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW 5 107 (McKinney 1955) provides: 
Except with the consent and approval of the public service commission first had and 
obtained, no public utility shall use revenues received from the rendition of public service 
within the state for any purpose other than its operating, maintenance and depreciation 
expenses, the construction, extension, improvement or maintenance of its facilities and 
service, the payment of its indebtedness and interest thereon, and the payment of divi- 
dends to its stockholders. 
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men@ against the individual officers and directors for $50,000, holding 
that NYT's contribution violated section 460 because an election referen- 
dum is political within the meaning of the phrase "for any political 
purpose whatever." The court also held that NYT's contribution 
violated section 107 of the New York Public Service Law because the 
payment was neither incurred by NYT as an operating expense nor ap- 
proved by the New York Public Service Commission as a nonoperating 
expense. The court further held that prohibiting NYT's contribution to 
YES did not contravene NYT's first amendment rights of expression 
since the legislative purposes behind the statute "justiEf. restriction of the 
rights of a public utility to engage in political advocacy." On appeal, 
the Second Circuit reversed, finding no violation of section 460 since 
NYT's contribution had been made in support of a nonpartisan bond 
referendum. The circuit court also held that section 107 had not been 
violated, relying primarily upon a New York Public Service Commission 
ruling, issued subsequent to the district court's decision, which approved 
NYT's contribution to YES.6 
A. History and Objectives of Corrupt Practices Legislation 
Section 460 of the New York Election Law was enacted in 19067 in 
response to a joint senate and assembly investigation of life insurance 
companies which revealed, in part, that several New York legislators con- 
sistently protected the interests of life insurance companies that had 
given financial assistance to their election campaigns.8 Illustrative of the 
spirit in which the money had been given is the following statement by 
an executive officer of a life insurance company which made a practice 
of contributing to election campaigns: 
I don't justify the use of money for campaign purposes. I justify the use 
of these funds in the protection of the policyholder's interests. I don't 
5Defendant YES was granted summary judgment in its favor on the ground that plaintiff 
had failed to establish that YES had acted unlawfully, or that it had, or breached, any duty 
to AT&T shareholders. 
6Plaintiff also argued thar NYT's contribution was ultra vires as an unauthorized corporate 
act. The court discarded this theory, however, holding that to the extent NYT's contribution 
was prompted by a concern for transportation and the economy as a whole, it was protected 
by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW $202(a)(12) (McKinney 1963); and to the extent it was prompted by 
the business benefits to be derived from better roadways, it was protected by the traditional 
corporate benefit rule. 
This case note will consider only the issues encompassed by section 460 and will reflect on  
the other main issues only as they relate to section 460. 
'The initial prohibition against corporate campaign contributions was enacted as part of 
the General Corporation Law. From 1928 to 1965 it was part of the Penal Law. It  became 
part of the Election Law in 1965. 
8A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 129 (1 960). 
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care about the Republican side of it, or the Democratic side of it. . . . 
What is best for the New York Life is what moves and actuates me.9 
Motivated by similar concerns, Congress and 33 other state legislatures 
passed statutes similar to section 460.1° Most of these statutes are part of 
a comprehensive scheme regulating corrupt practices in election cam- 
paigns and were enacted to accomplish two main 0bjectives:ll (1) to 
prevent corporate officers from using shareholders' assets to influence the 
outcome of elections or to support candidates, parties, or issues which 
some shareholders might oppose; and (2) to prevent postelection obliga- 
tions running from the successful candidate to the donor of the funds. 
Corrupt practice statutes typically provide criminal sanctions, both for 
those who authorize prohibited contributions and for the recipients of 
the contributions, including fines h-om $500 to $10,000 and jail sen- 
tences up to one year.l2 
B. Scope of the Legislation 
Although the federal and several of the state statutes prohibit only 
corporate contributions to political parties and candidates running for 
public office,l3 18 of the state statutes are of breadth similar to New 
York's, in that they effectively prohibit corporate contributions for "any 
political purpose whatever. "I4 The courts are divided, however, as to 
whether corporate contributions paid to others to influence the outcome 
of referenda constitute a prohibited contribution for a political purpose.l? 
In People v .  Gansley,16 a brewing company's contribution to a political 
9Zd. 
1OThe federal statute is found at 18 U.S.C. 5 610 (1970). The state statutes include e.g., FLA. 
STAT. ANN. 5 104.091 (1960); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, 5 7 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. 
$31-27-1 1 (1953). 
"See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-75 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 
106, 1 13, 134-35 (1948); Barrow, Regulation of Campaign Funding and Spending for Federal 
Ofice, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 159, 163 (1972); Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contri- 
butions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1966). 
12E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 9-345 (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, 5 7 (Supp. 
1975); TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 14.07 (Supp. 1974). In addition, several statutes provide 
for corporate fines or withdrawal of the right to do business within the state. E.g., MINN. 
STAT. ANN. 5 21 1.27 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
13The federal statu-te, 18 U.S.C. $610 (1970), prohibits corporate contributions or expendi- 
tures "in connection with" any election for federal ofice. State statutes which apply only to 
corporate contributions to political parties or candidates include e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
5 16-471 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 19:34-45 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. $260.472 (1973). 
14E.g., MJCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 168.919 (1967) (any election expenses whatever); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 5 3599.03 (Page 1972) (any other partisan political purpose); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
5 3-8-8 (1 97 1 ) (other election expenses whatever). 
15For a general discussion of the role corporate contributions play in ballot-measure cam- 
paigns see Comment, Corporate Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 6 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 781 (1973). 
16191 Mich. 357,364-67, 158 N.W. 195, 197-99 (1916). 
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committee organized to defeat a local option election in Michigan which 
would have prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor within the 
county, was held to be a prohibited political contribution. Under similar 
facts, the Indiana Supreme Court in State v .  Fairbanks17 upheld an 
indictment charging a brewing company's president with making illegal 
campaign contributions. In a more recent case, however, State ex  rel. 
Corrigan v .  Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.,l8 a corporate contribution of $500 
to a committee created for the purpose of advocating certain propositions 
and issues to be submitted to the Ohio voters, was held proper. Citing 
the Ohio statute which proscribes corporate contributions to "partisan 
political purposes, " the court stated : 
Thus, although the words "political purposes" may be given a broad con- 
struction as including any purpose related to the principles of civil 
government and the conduct of public affairs, they may also be given a 
much narrower construction as including only a "partisan" political 
purpose. In the instant case, we must so limit these words because the 
General Assembly has used the word "partisan" to limit them.19 
By judicial construction, a similar gloss has frequently been added to 
the corrupt practice acts of other states, even where the word partisan 
was lacking2(' The range of activities comprehended by "partisan politi- 
cal activity," however, is often as unclear as the range of activities com- 
prehended by "political activity. " In the Corrigan case, for example, the 
court relied on the word partisan in reaching a decision but failed to 
articulate a meaningful definition. 
C.  First Amendment  Considerations 
Closely associated with the definitional difficulties are the constitu- 
tional uncertainties of the corrupt practice statutes. In recent years, the 
corporate spending prohibition has been severely attacked by com- 
mentators who argue that total prohibition of corporate campaign spend- 
ing is an unconstitutional violation of the corporation's first amendment 
right of exp re s s i~n .~~  Defenders of the prohibition answer that Congress 
17187 Ind. 648, 115 N.E. 769 (1917); but see State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248, 
115 N.E. 772 (1917), where the Indiana Supreme Court upheld dismissal of similar charges 
against the corporation. 
'8169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331 (1959). 
191d. at 44, 157 N.E.2d at 333. See aLso States ex re1 Nybo v. District Court, 158 Mont.'429, 
492 P.2d 1395 (1972), where a statute prohibiting corporate contributions "in order to pro- 
mote the interests, success or defeat of any political party or organization" was held inapplicable 
to contributions to support passage of a sales tax. 
20See generally United States Civil Sew. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 
U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). The Supreme Court 
has interpreted regulations limiting the political activities of civil service employees to include 
partisan political activities only. 
21See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 637 (1970); H. PENNIMAN A D R. 
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has reasonably exercised its constitutional authority in protecting the 
electoral system from harmful and corrupting influence.22 In response, 
state and federal courts have generally tended to avoid delineating the 
permissible breadth of corporate expression in the context of corrupt 
practice acts,23 and have adhered to the rule of statutory construction 
which requires a statute to be construed, if possible, so as to avoid the con- 
clusion that it is unconstitutional. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never construed the 
federal ban on corporate campaign contributions, it has on three occa- 
sions construed that part of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act dealing 
with expenditures by labor unions in support of political campaigns,24 
which would appear to be equally applicable to corporate contributions 
to similar causes.25 On each occasion, however, the Court stopped short 
of the constitutional issues raised, relying generally on statutory construc- 
tion to hold that the union expenditures did not fall within the language 
of the ~tatute.~6 
HOWARD, CAMPAIGN FINANCES: TWO VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICA- 
TIONS 1 (1972); Ferman, Congressional Controls on Campaign Financing: An Expansion or 
Contraction of the First Amendment?, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1972); King, Corporate Political 
Spending and the First Amendment, 23 U. PITT. L. &v. 847,854-79 (1962); Lambert, Corporate 
Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1060-66 (1 965). 
Z2See Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Rosenthal] , Note, Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds, 
66 HARV. L. REV. 1259, 1260-61 (1953). For a general discussion of the free speech implications 
of campaign spending prohibitions see Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Ex- 
penditure Ceilings, 7 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 214 (1972). 
23Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 
1060-66 (1 965). 
24 
The  Smith-Connally Act of 1943 contained a provision which extended the provisions of 
section 313 [18 U.S.C. 5 6101 to labor organizations . . . . In 1947 . . . a labor bill . . . had 
the effect of continuing permanently the application of section 313 to labor organiza- 
tions. 
Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 61 (1958). 
25The REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O  CAMPAIGN COSTS, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS 20-21 (1962) stated: 
From our study of the section [18 U.S.C. § 6101, its legislative history, and the applicable 
court decisions, it is clear that no distinction is intended between corporations and unions 
with respect to political contributions and expenditures. 
261n United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), the union supported a candidate for Con- 
gress in a regular union newspaper which was published with union funds and distributed 
solely to union members. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the 
statute was an unconstitutional abridgment of the first amendment. The Supreme Court af- 
firmed the dismissal but did so solely on the ground that a publication in a regular union 
newspaper which was distributed only to members and a few other persons is not reached by 
the statute. In a minority opinion, four Justices concurred in the result but argued that any 
prohibition against union expenditures would be unconstitutional as an interference with 
free speech. 
In United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Supreme Court upheld an indictment for 
using union funds to pay for a television broadcast supporting certain candidates for federal 
office. Holding that the constitutional issues were not ripe for adjudication, the Court re- 
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Several lower courts, however, have confronted the constitutionality 
of corporate spending prohibitions. In United States u. United States 
Brewers' Assoc ia t i~n ,~~  the Western District Court of Pennsylvania up- 
held an indictment charging the corporation with conspiring to make 
money contributions in a congressional election. The  district court 
explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute, stating: 
The section itself neither prevents, nor purports to prohibit, the freedom 
of speech or of the press. Its purpose is to guard elections from cor- 
ruption, and the electorate from corrupting influences in arriving at their 
choice.28 
In a more recent case, United States w .  Boyle,zg the District Court of the 
District of Columbia sustained an indictment charging union officials 
with conspiracy to violate the federal statute. The court found that the 
statute did not unreasonably infringe on rights of free speech and associa- 
tion beyond those which the government had demonstrated a compelling 
interest in regulating.sO On the other hand, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court in First National Bank v .  Attorney GeneraP1 held unconstitu- 
manded the case for trial on the merits, suggesting the lower court analyze the following ques- 
tions: (1) whether the expenditures were from union dues or from voluntary contributions of 
the members; (2) whether the broadcast reached the public at large or only union members; 
(3) whether the expenditures involved active "electioneering" or o ~ l y  the publication of statis- 
tics or records of candidates; and (4) whether the expenditure was made to affect the results of 
the election. On remand, the jury found the union not guilty after considering the foregoing 
factors. A three-Justice dissenting opinion labeled the statute unconstitutional and criticized 
the majority as allowing "a broadside assault on the freedom of political expression guaranteed 
by the First Amendment." I d .  at 598. 
In Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972), the Supreme Court reversed 
a circuit court decision upholding the constitutionality of the federal statute, but only on the 
grounds that an improper charge had been given to the jury regarding voluntariness of mem- 
ber contributions to union political funds. 
27239 F.163 (W.D. Pa. 1916). 
281d. at 169. The court cited no precedent and gave no reasons for upholding the validity 
of the statute. It stated: "So far as I am aware, it has never been claimed that this general 
restriction upon political contributions was an infringement of the freedom of the press." 
29338 F. Supp. 1028 (D.D.C. 1972). 
3OIn reaching its decision, the court balanced the interests of the government in protecting 
the electoral system against the labor organization's interest in free speech. See also United 
States v. Lewis Food Company, 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Painters Local 
481,172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949). 
3l290 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1972). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, 0 7 (Supp. 1975) proscribes 
corporate contributions " [fJ or the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination 
or election of any person to public ofice. . . or influencing or affecting the vote on any ques- 
tion submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business 
or assets of the corporation." A 1972 amendment added the provision that " [n] o question 
submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of 
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corpora- 
tion." The court held that the amendment amounted to impermissible censorship and was 
unconstitutional under both the first and fourteenth amendments, since the defendant attorney 
general had failed to show a compelling state interest in imposing a total ban on corporate 
expression. I d .  at 539. 
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tional the section of the Massachusetts corrupt practices statute which 
prohibited the plaintiff bank from spending money for advertising and 
publicity in its effort to defeat a proposed state constitutional amend- 
ment authorizing a graduated income tax. In a similar case, United States 
v .  First National Bank,32 the Southern District Court of Ohio dismissed 
the indictment of a national bank for having made a loan to a campaign 
committee. Emphasizing the difference between a prohibited political 
contribution by a corporation and a loan made in the ordinary course of 
a bank's activities, the court concluded with the following interpretation 
of section 6 10 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act: 
The evil in Section 610 is not that it prohibits the political expression of 
a national bank, but that it directly affects the political expression of 
individuals who may wish to utilize their assets to secure credit on behalf 
of a particular candidate.33 
The most recent New York case construing section 460 of the New 
York Election Law, Pecora v .  Queens County Bar A~sociat ion,~~ held 
that endorsement of political candidates by a local bar association was not 
a prohibited activity. Although the court avoided the constitutional 
issue by narrowly interpreting the words "political purpose," it indicated 
that a literal interpretation would stifle constitutionally protected expres- 
sion.35 
The present case is representative of how the courts have avoided the 
constitutional issue by narrowing the scope of the statute's application. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a ban on contributions 
for "political purposes" did not include corporate contributions to "non- 
partisan" referenda. Citing legislative history leading to enactment of 
section 460, the court stated: 
Thus the avowed objective was not to bar all corporate expenditures 
with respect to legislative matters generally but to prohibit corporate 
contributions to candidates or parties, since such contributions might 
tend to create political debts . . . . 
In all this legislative history we find no indication that the framers 
envisioned the application of 5 460 to referenda.36 
-- 
32329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971). 
33Id. at 1254. There is now included in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act an exception for 
bona fide bank loans. Campaign Act 5 205,86 Stat. 10, amending 18 U.S.C. 5 610 (1970). 
3446 Misc. 2d 530,260 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
35The court decided that the bar association had a professional duty to the public to see 
that only qualified candidates attained judicial offices and therefore the association was not 
using funds for an entirely "political" purpose. Id. at 537,260 N.Y.S.2d at 123. 
36495 F.2d 844,850 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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The court concluded that referenda are not susceptible to those corrupt- 
ing influences which prompted enactment of section 460. 
Candidly avoiding the first amendment issue, the court further stated: 
In adopting a narrow interpretation of 5 460 we are but following the 
example set by the Supreme Court in its encounters with the Cor- 
rupt Practices Act, the federal analog of 5 460. Concerned with 
the serious constitutional doubts that would afflict a broad interpretation 
of the federal statute's prohibition of contributions or expenditures in 
support of a political candidate, the court has consciously opted for a 
restrictive reading of the statute's words.37 
Accordingly, the court held that the contribution from NYT to YES 
was not prohibited by section 460. 
A. Legislative History 
In arriving at the conclusion that corporate contributions in the con- 
text of a "nonpartisan" referendum were not for "political purposes," 
the majority in Schwartz cited Elihu Root's porposed constitutional 
amendment presented to the New York State Constitutional Convention 
in 1894,38 as the forerunner of section 460 and noted that the amend- 
ment was specifically concerned with the corruption of legislators, a 
concern usually of little importance in the context of a referendum vote. 
Although unsuccessful in his efforts, Root urged adoption of the amend- 
ment in order to: 
[PI revent the great moneyed corporations of the country from furnish- 
ing the money with which to elect members of the Legislature of this 
State in order that those members of the Legislature may vote to protect 
the corporations. . . . [TI he time has come when something ought to be 
done to put a check to the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great cor- 
poration toward political purposes, upon the understanding that a debt 
is created from a political party to it, a debt to be recognized and repaid 
with the votes of representatives in the Legislature and in Congress . . . .39 
The dissenting opinion sharply criticized the court's reliance on the 
Root amendment as misplaced, and cited the 1906 Report of the Joint 
Committee of the Senate and Assembly of New York Appointed to In- 
vestigate the Affairs of Lzfe Insurance Companies40 as the impetus for 
section 460. The following statement from the committee's report illus- 
trates that possible improper application of shareholder funds was con- 
3'1d. at 852. 
383 Revised Record of the 1894 New York State Constitutional Convention 885 (1900). 
391d. at 894-95. 
40495 F.2d at 855. 
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sidered as important a reason for regulating corporate contributions as 
the purchase of political influence. 
Contributions by insurance corporations for political purposes should be 
strictly forbidden. Neither executive officers nor directors should be 
allowed to use the moneys paid for purposes of insurance in support 
of political candidates or platforms. . . . Whether made for the purpose 
of supporting political views or with the desire to obtain protection for 
the corporation, these contributions have been wholly unjustifiable. In 
the one case executive officers have sought to impose their political views 
upon a constituency of divergent convictions, and in the other they have 
been guilty of a serious offense against public morals.41 
B. Statutory Construction 
The dissent also criticized the court's conclusion that the statute on its 
face is not applicable to a referendum which has bipartisan supp0rt.4~ 
Citing the statute's omnibus clause which prohibits corporate contribu- 
tions "for any political purpose whatever," and a clause preceding the 
omnibus clause that prohibits gifts to "any corporation, joint-stock or 
other association organized or maintained for political purposes, " the 
dissent suggested that the language of both clauses goes beyond contribu- 
tions to the traditional political party or candidate for public office. 
Although meager, New York case law supports the proposition that 
section 460 encompasses payments to any entity created to achieve a 
political purpose. In People ex rel. Bohlinger v .  International Workers 
Order, Inc.,43 a New York lower court found that contributions by a 
labor organization for the support of communist policies and candidates 
it favored violated section 460; no weight was placed on whether the 
recipient was one of the traditional political parties. The referendum 
matter in Schwartz, regardless of any support it may have received from 
the Republican and Democratic parties, was not a one-sided, non- 
political issue. The dissent properly characterized the campaign preced- 
ing the election as "perhaps the most bitterly contested issue of the 197 1 
campaign."44 YES was organized and maintained for the sole purpose of 
campaigning for voter approval of the transportation bond referendum, 
an extremely partisan position, especially in light of the overwhelming 
vote against the action in the 1 97 1 general election. 
41Zd. (emphasis added). 
42The court based this conclusion on the bipartisan support the bond issue received in the 
state senate and assembly. The senate vote was 42 in favor (27 Republicans and 15 Democrats) 
and 13 against (three Republicans and ten Democrats); the assembly vote was 124 in favor (61 
Republicans and 63 Democrats) and 25 against (17 Republicans and eight Democrats). Brief 
for Individual Appellants at 5, Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). 
43305 N.Y. 258, 112 N.E.2d 280 (1953). 
44495 F.2d at 857. 
CASE NOTES 
C. Policy Considerations 
The dissent further contended that the bond referendum did lend it- 
self to the corrupting influences which prompted enactment of section 
460. Appellees suggested that NYT's contribution to YES was moti- 
vated by a desire to purchase influence with the governor who was totally 
devoted to the passage of the proposition, and whose appointments secre- 
tary resigned for a brief period to head up the efforts of YES. The three 
public utility companies who had contributed to YES,45 including NYT, 
were at that time seeking rate increases from the New York Public Ser- 
vice Commission, whose members are appointed by the governor.46 Al- 
though there was no evidence to support suspicions of influence 
peddling, the dissent asserted that application of section 460 should not 
depend upon the purity of the donees or the probity of the donors, but 
rather upon the opportunities for abuse created by the corporate contri- 
bution.47 The "opportunities for abuse" standard is particularly im- 
portant in this case since large political contributions by public utilities 
may result in favors with respect to rate making or in higher utility 
rates to make up for the cost of the contributions. 
D. First Amendment Considerations 
In narrowing the scope of section 460, the court believed that a broad 
construction of the statute would impinge upon corporate first amend- 
ment rights by prohibiting the expression of corporate views on im- 
portant public issues. While this belief musters wide support, its legiti- 
macy is dependent upon two substantive issues, neither expressly dis- 
cussed by the court: (1) the extent to which corporate contributions for 
political purposes are expression entitled to first amendment protection, 
and (2) the appropriate scope of that protection. 
1. Extent of corporate first amendment protection: the corporate 
character. Historically, corporations have been given some, but not all, 
of the constitutional rights of indi~iduals.~g Although they enjoy the 
protection of the due process and equal protection clauses, they are not 
deemed to be citizens for purposes of the privileges and immunities 
clause. In addition, they have no privilege against self-incrimination, 
45N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 75, col. 3, reported seven known corporate contributors 
including the three utility companies. The contributions totaled $159,000. 
46495 F.2d at 857 n.3. 
4'1d. In recognition of this potential for abuse, legislatures of many states have enacted 
statutes similar to section 107 of the New York Public Service Law which prohibit the use of 
revenues received from the rendition of public service for nonoperating expenses. 
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority in Schwartz for not determining whether 
NYT's contribution to YES actually came from nonutility revenues. T o  say that they had non- 
utility revenues at the time of the contribution, claimed the dissent, is not dispositive of the 
issue of what revenues were actually used. Id.  at 859. 
48See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 380. 
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and significantly to this discussion, they cannot vote. The Supreme 
Court has held that corporations are entitled to first amendment protec- 
ti0n.~9 The  decisions so holding, however, appear to be confined to 
particular fact situations. In many of the cases, the corporations were in 
the business of communicating information to the public, and the expres- 
sion protected "was related to that function rather than to some extrane- 
ous interest. "50 AS one commentator stated: 
There is a clear distinction between an editorial, news article, or 
advertisement in a newspaper in support of a candidate and contributions 
by a corporation to finance speeches or advertisements in support of a 
candidate it believes to be friendly to its interests.51 
Other cases suggest that corporate first amendment protection is de- 
rived from the first amendment rights of individuals within the corpora- 
tion. In NAACP v. Alabama,52 for example, the Supreme Court upheld 
the refusal of a New York NAACP chapter to produce its membership 
lists on the ground that it was asserting the first amendment rights of 
its members. As to corporations engaged in the business of disseminat- 
ing news to the public such as a newspaper corporation, however, it may 
legitimately be asked whether the rights protected are those of the cor- 
poration itself or those of the potential reader or listener.53 In any event, 
it seems clear that the law is presently uncertain as to the extent of cor- 
porate first amendment rights. 
2. Scope of first amendment protection: the communicative act. Ap- 
parently assuming that NYT was entitled to first amendment protection, 
the court in Schwartz went on to equate NYT's contribution with expres- 
sion. Although the Supreme Court has held in certain areas of the law 
that protection under the first amendment is not limited to speech, but 
applies also to conduct which is so interrelated with expression that to 
divorce one from the other is to effectively deny the expression,54 it does 
not follow that corporate money contributions, even if they are the only 
means by which a corporation can communicate, are part of expression 
entitled to first amendment protection. One author commented that: 
49Several cases are discussed in the materials cited note 21 supra. 
50Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 380. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Grosjean v. American Press Co,, 
297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
SIRosenthal, supra note 22, at 380. This distinction was also important in United States v. 
CIO and United States v. UAW, supra note 26. It appears that the Court used an internal- 
external distribution test in upholding the publication of a solely owned union newspaper, but 
questioning the use of union funds to buy television time. 
52357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
53See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
%ee, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. 
Button, 37 1 U.S. 415 (1963). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
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The right to speak . . . is more central to the values envisaged by the First 
Amendment than the right to spend. We are dealing here not so much 
with the right of personal expression or even association, but with dollars 
and decibels. And just as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so 
the volume of dollars may be limited without violating the First Amend- 
ment.55 
The same author also compared the large contributor who exerts 
"influence through wealth" to speakers using a "bullhorn or a micro- 
phone to enlarge the reach of their voices," and stated that both "are 
operating vicariously through the power of their purse, rather than 
through the power of their ideas, and . . . I would scale that relatively 
lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values."56 The ultimate 
resolution of the constitutional issue requires that a distinction be drawn 
which upholds the validity of the restraint on mere contributions of 
money, but overturns applications that touch too closely upon the direct 
communication of ideas.57 
3. NYT's contribution to YES. In Schwartr, the expressive element 
of NYT's contribution of corporate assets to YES was mitigated by several 
factors. First, the nature of NYT's communicative act, a money contri- 
bution to support the efforts of YES, was diluted because (I) control over 
the use of the money was given entirely to YES, and (2) identification of 
NYT as a corporate contributor occurred after the election and then only 
in response to inquiries made by the New York Times.58 The importance 
of these facts was stressed by Mr. Justice Reed, writing for the five-man 
majority in United States v.  CZO: 
If section 31 3 [18 U.S.C. 5 6101 were construed to prohibit the publica- 
tion, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting 
their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, or stockholders, or 
customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of 
measures, or the election to office of men espousing such measures, the 
gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality.59 
Second, the character of NYT, a public utility corporation not en- 
gaged in the business of disseminating news to the general public, and 
whose activities are closely scrutinized because of its unique nature and 
relationship with the general public, weakens its claim to absolute first 
amendment protection. Here NYT supported with shareholder assets 
a transportation bond issue which the majority of New York residents, 
including NYT shareholders, voted against. It is therefore difficult to 
55Freund, Commentary in A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QESTIONS 72 (1971). 
561d. at 74. 
57Rosentha1, supra note 22, at 382. 
58N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 75, col. 3. 
59335 U.S. at 121 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
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justify the contribution as an assertion of the rights of NYT's customers 
and stockholders in favor of the bond issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court in Schwartz should have balanced the firm judicial policy 
which favors avoidance of constitutional issues against an equally im- 
portant rule of statutory construction: " [A] voidance of a difficulty will 
not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion. "60 Construing sec- 
tion 460 in view of the conditions which existed at the time of its enact- 
ment and which still exist today,61 it is clear that the New York Legisla- 
ture intended the proscriptions of the statute to apply to both candidate 
and ballot-measure campaigns. T o  hold otherwise is to elevate form over 
substance and effectively frustrate legislative objectives. 
The court could have justifiably interpreted the statute to include 
referenda and still upheld its constitutionality since the first amendment 
protection to which NYT may have been entitled was mitigated by the 
nature of its alleged communicative act and by its corporate character. 
Failure of the court to confront the constitutional issue puts a loophole in 
the statute which may open the door to unlimited corporate financial 
participation in ballot-measure campaigns regardless of obvious oppor- 
tunities for abuse. 
The fact that there are some questions as to the constitutionality of 
the corporate spending prohibition does not justify judicial avoidance of 
those issues. The electoral system is fundamental to our system of repre- 
sentative democracy. Protecting it requires the highest degree of coopera- 
tion between the legislative and judicial branches of government. 
60;2100re Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933). 
61Recent scandals arising from corporate campaign contributions illustrate the continued 
validity of the objectives which prompted enactment of the corrupt practice statutes. In 1970, 
the officers and directors of two large shipping lines were convicted and fined $50,000 each 
for making illegal campaign contributions; each had recently received multimillion dollar 
government subsidies. REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FINANCING 
CAMPAIGNS, ELECTING CONGRESS, THE FINANCIAL DILEMNA 49 (1970). In 1971, allegations of a 
link between an antitrust settlement favorable to International Telephone and Telegraph 
Company ( ITT)  and ITT's simultaneous pledge to underwrite for $400,000 the 1972 Repub- 
lican national convention initiated investigations which continue today. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 
1972, at 24. In 1973, officers and directors of several corporations including American Airlines 
Company, 3hI Corporation, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Gulf Oil Company, and 
Ashland Oil Company all pleaded guilty to formal charges of making illegal corporate contri- 
butions to President Nixon's reelection campaign hnd .  AVIATION WEEK, Oct. 22, 1973, at 36; 
NEWSWEEK, NOV. 26, 1953, at 34; U.S. NEWS, NOV. 26, 1973, at 28. In 1974, two former officials 
of the nation's largest milk producer-cooperative were sentenced to prison after being 
found guilty of charges involving illegal campaign donations, including $600,000 for the Nixon 
reelection campaign. According to testimony before congressional committees, the money was 
part of $2 million pledged to Nixon by the dairy group in connection with the 1971 milk 
support prices. Salt Lake Tribune, Nov. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 1. 
